US Treasury escalates financial offensive against fentanyl networks

Sanctions against Mexican financial institutions mark a decisive shift toward targeting the financial arteries of the global drug trade.

In a sweeping new enforcement action, the US Treasury Department has deployed expansive powers under the newly enacted FEND Off Fentanyl Act to target the financial arteries of Mexico’s opioid trafficking cartels.

On June 25, 2025, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) designated three major Mexican financial institutions, CIBanco, Intercam, and Vector Casa de Bolsa, as primary money laundering concerns.

This unprecedented move marks the first use of Treasury’s enhanced authority under recent anti-fentanyl legislation and places strict prohibitions on any fund transfers involving these institutions, including through convertible virtual currencies.

Initiative to stop financial links to supply chains

The initiative aims to sever critical financial links supporting the illegal fentanyl supply chain channeling the drug into the US, where overdose deaths continue to climb.

The institutions named, two commercial banks and one brokerage, collectively manage over $20 billion in assets and are accused of enabling payments for precursor chemicals sourced from China and laundering proceeds on behalf of powerful cartels like Sinaloa, and the Gulf Cartel.

Treasury officials point to evidence such as meetings between bank executives and cartel operatives, and wire transfers totaling millions of dollars routed through opaque accounts. Vector, for instance, is cited for handling transfers over nearly a decade, while CIBanco is linked to efforts to launder $10 million on behalf of a Gulf Cartel affiliate. These transactions, according to FinCEN, represent deep-rooted compliance failures and willful participation in illicit finance networks.

The broader policy context underscores the US government’s sharpened focus on a strategy of treating drug cartels as both criminal enterprises and national security threats. Earlier this year, President Trump signed an executive order classifying several cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

The FinCEN designations align with that policy shift, leveraging the US financial system as a frontline tool in dismantling cartel infrastructure. Importantly, the latest orders reflect not only punitive intent but also an effort to pressure Mexican institutions and regulators into raising anti-money laundering standards.

Treasury officials point to evidence such as meetings between bank executives and cartel operatives, and wire transfers totaling millions of dollars routed through opaque accounts.

The orders take effect 21 days after publication in the Federal Register, giving US financial institutions a narrow window to unwind any relationships with the named entities. The prohibitions are sweeping: applying to dollar transactions, account services, and digital assets.

While FinCEN’s action is squarely aimed at opioid financing, its scope hints at a potentially broader application of the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, setting a precedent for aggressive extraterritorial financial enforcement.

Money laundering concern over CIBanco

CIBanco, a mid-sized commercial bank headquartered in Mexico City with over 200 domestic branches and $7 billion in assets, has been formally designated by FinCEN as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern.

The finding, made under the new authorities of the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, follows extensive evidence showing the bank’s involvement in facilitating transactions for some of Mexico’s most violent drug trafficking organizations, including the Gulf Cartel, Beltrán-Leyva Organization (BLO), and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG).

These groups have been repeatedly linked to the production and export of illicit synthetic opioids, particularly fentanyl, using precursor chemicals sourced from China and trafficked through clandestine labs in Mexico.

While the bank claims to operate a money laundering prevention system and adheres to sustainability and AML principles, regulators found little to suggest that these programs were either enforced or effective.

According to FinCEN, CIBanco played a recurring role in laundering cartel proceeds and processing suspicious transactions that directly supported the trafficking infrastructure. In 2023, for instance, a bank employee knowingly helped open an account intended to launder $10 million for a Gulf Cartel operative.

From 2021 to 2024, CIBanco processed more than $2.1 million in payments from Mexican firms to Chinese exporters of precursor chemicals used in fentanyl production. Several of these transactions were linked to companies previously implicated in drug seizures or suspected of fronting for criminal networks. In one case, over $100 million in transfers involving a CJNG-linked broker were routed through the bank to suppliers in Taiwan and Switzerland under the guise of legitimate trade.

FinCEN’s analysis goes beyond transactional patterns to question the integrity of CIBanco’s compliance framework. While the bank claims to operate a money laundering prevention system and adhere to sustainability and AML principles, regulators found little to suggest that these programs were either enforced or effective.

Moreover, the institution’s access to US dollar clearing, via two U.S. correspondent banks, amplified the risk of transmitting dirty money through the US financial system. Although the bank services some legitimate clients, FinCEN determined that these functions could be readily absorbed by other Mexican institutions with more robust controls, while its continued access to US finance posed unacceptable risks.

By opting for the strongest available sanction, a blanket prohibition on all fund transmittals involving CIBanco, FinCEN has not only severed a key node in the financial networks supporting fentanyl trafficking but also set a precedent for how aggressively the US intends to enforce its new anti-opioid finance tools.

For CIBanco, the consequences are likely to be swift and severe: a loss of access to US financial institutions, reputational damage, and the likely collapse of its international operations.

Intercam linked to high-risk transactions

FinCEN’s designation of Intercam Banco as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern paints the picture of a deeply embedded, if more discreet, actor in Mexico’s fentanyl finance infrastructure.

Like CIBanco, Intercam has been linked to high-risk transactions involving Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), particularly the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), and to the financing of precursor chemicals imported from China.

But where CIBanco’s profile was marked by direct relationships with multiple cartels and a history of multi-million-dollar transfers for shell companies tied to chemical shipments, Intercam’s involvement appears more diffuse, sustained through high-volume, lower-visibility transactions across a wider web of intermediaries.

Multiple suspected money mules deposited millions of dollars into US accounts and wired funds to Intercam, underscoring its role in receiving repatriated drug proceeds.

Intercam’s facilitation of payments to known Chinese exporters of opioid precursors over several years, totaling millions of dollars, mirrors the pattern seen at CIBanco. However, FinCEN’s order highlights a unique operational risk: direct engagement between Intercam executives and suspected CJNG members.

In late 2022, Intercam’s leadership reportedly met face-to-face with cartel operatives to discuss laundering strategies, a level of complicity that suggests internal tolerance, if not institutional alignment.

Another key distinction lies in Intercam’s laundering mechanics. Where CIBanco relied heavily on commercial payments disguised as trade finance, Intercam showed a heavier use of mule accounts and US-based shell activity to cycle cartel funds back into Mexico.

Multiple suspected money mules deposited millions of dollars into US accounts and wired funds to Intercam, underscoring its role in receiving repatriated drug proceeds. This method, involving hundreds of micro-transactions and cross-border layering, signals more sophisticated evasion tactics (and perhaps, weaker controls) than the large, traceable wires that CIBanco processed.

Vector played key role in laundering proceeds

With its latest order under the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, FinCEN has extended its crackdown beyond traditional banks to include Vector Casa de Bolsa, one of Mexico’s largest brokerage firms.

Unlike CIBanco and Intercam, both commercial banks, Vector occupies a unique space as a capital markets intermediary with custody over more than $10 billion in assets. FinCEN found that the firm played a key role in laundering proceeds for two of Mexico’s most entrenched cartels, the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels, often by disguising illicit transactions behind securities activity and shell company operations.

The move underscores a growing awareness within US authorities that cartels are not only exploiting banks and remittance providers but increasingly turning to investment houses for more complex laundering strategies.

Vector’s involvement reflects a pattern of calculated opacity. FinCEN points to dozens of suspicious cross-border transactions, totaling millions of dollars, between Vector and China-based companies known to ship fentanyl precursor chemicals.

Moreover, Vector’s alleged relationship with corrupt Mexican officials, including laundering tens of millions linked to the disgraced ex-security chief Genaro García Luna, highlights a key risk: its services helped recycle not just drug money but also the proceeds of high-level political corruption.

CIBanco and Intercam were heavily involved in operational finance for cartels; Vector, by contrast, served as a discreet storehouse and laundering conduit for elite DTO facilitators.

Global momentum

The designation of CIBanco, Intercam, and Vector under the FEND Off Fentanyl Act signals a new chapter in US financial sanctions strategy: one that integrates counter-narcotics enforcement more tightly with financial regulation. But this is not the first time Mexico-based institutions have faced money laundering allegations from US authorities.

What distinguishes the 2025 FinCEN actions is the preventive, forward-leaning posture: instead of levying penalties after the fact, Treasury is now proactively cutting off entire institutions from the US financial system, using emergency powers tied to national security and public health threats.

Vector’s involvement reflects a pattern of calculated opacity.

This strategy is not occurring in isolation. The fight against fentanyl has gone global, with Canada accelerating its AML reforms, and multilateral cooperation expanding through law enforcement and financial intelligence exchanges.

Financial institutions are no longer passive bystanders in the opioid crisis. From rural credit unions to major broker-dealers, every actor in the financial system is now expected to play a frontline role. The tools are in place: beneficial ownership registries, safe harbors for interbank information sharing, and expanding enforcement mandates.

But compliance programs must evolve beyond checkbox audits to dynamic, intelligence-led systems that respond to emerging typologies. In an era where illicit finance directly translates into tragic drug deaths, the cost of complacency is no longer just reputational—it’s humanitarian.