At the 2025 Grunin Center Conference on Law and Social Entrepreneurship, one of the most future-facing discussions focused on the evolving role of blockchain technologies. The Grunin Conference, held annually at NYU School of Law, gathers legal scholars and practitioners working at the intersection of business, systems thinking, and public interest.

The panel addressed this theme from complementary angles: one examined the SEC’s enforcement trajectory and pending legislation affecting digital assets; the other explored decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) as experimental governance tools with implications for equity, transparency, and capital formation.

Beyond the legal frameworks and institutional questions, the panels prompted some deeper contemplation: successful blockchain adoption may ultimately test humanity on two fronts—our willingness to coordinate across borders, and our capacity to depart from familiar 20th-century financial and regulatory models.

Whether we choose to innovate or retrench will shape not only the future of this technology, but also the systems of trust we build in its wake.

Building better blockchain governance

A Grunin panel on blockchain governance and financial innovation offered a close look at the shifting role of US regulatory bodies, particularly the SEC, in shaping the future of decentralized finance. Much of the discussion revolved around the SEC’s historic reliance on traditional registration frameworks, especially when applied to initial coin offerings (ICOs), and the market resistance these efforts provoked.

Panelists cited empirical data showing that enforcement actions demanding retroactive compliance with registration requirements had a chilling effect on market confidence. By contrast, actions focused on fraud and market manipulation were generally welcomed, suggesting that investors are not averse to regulation per se, but seek clear, tailored rules that distinguish between bad actors and legitimate innovators.

At the heart of the discussion was the recognition that digital tokens cannot be cleanly mapped onto legacy asset classes. Tokens may function as securities, commodities, or payment instruments depending on their design and use case, and this fluidity continues to challenge enforcement norms.

Recent interpretive guidance from the SEC, such as that released by the Division of Corporation Finance, indicates a slow but meaningful shift. Regulators appear to be acknowledging that the one-size-fits-all model, rooted in the Howey Test and 20th-century securities law, may not be sufficient for governing tokenized ecosystems.

Panelists also discussed the development of safe harbor proposals, which would give early-stage crypto projects a window to decentralize and mature before triggering full regulatory scrutiny. Although such proposals remain advisory for now, they reflect growing institutional interest in more pragmatic, innovation-sensitive approaches.

The legislative landscape, too, is beginning to reflect this evolution. Stablecoins emerged as a focal point in the panel, with extensive debate around two competing bills in Congress: the House’s Clarity for Payment Stablecoins Act and the Senate’s Gensler-Gillibrand Responsible Financial Innovation Act (sometimes referred to as the “Genius Act”).

Both propose licensing regimes for stablecoin issuers, reserve requirements backed by fiat assets like US Treasuries, and clearer jurisdictional boundaries between the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).

Notably, the Genius Act would allow non-bank entities, such as fintechs, to obtain federal licenses through the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a provision widely seen as a bid to broaden market participation.

The bills also seek to address concerns around foreign stablecoin issuers targeting US consumers: an issue sharpened by the dominance of offshore actors like Tether.

The implications of these legislative efforts go beyond consumer protection. As panelists noted, stablecoin regulation has become a proxy for larger geopolitical objectives: supporting US dollar dominance, deepening demand for Treasury securities, and countering alternative digital currencies promoted by foreign powers.

The panel closed with a sober assessment of the regulatory plumbing still needed to accommodate tokenized assets more broadly. Efforts like the introduction of Article 12 to the Uniform Commercial Code, which recognizes digital tokens as property, were praised as foundational, enabling legal clarity around token ownership and dispute resolution.

But ultimately, panelists stressed that without a unified and forward-looking legal framework, the US risks losing its competitive edge in blockchain innovation, even as it tries to ensure that investor protection and systemic integrity remain front and center.

Blockchain and innovation

This Grunin panel also turned its attention to Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), which are increasingly viewed as experimental governance models with far-reaching implications for early-stage investment, IP ownership, and nonprofit innovation.

At their core, DAOs function as code-based collectives that allow participants, often dispersed globally, to vote on how pooled funds are allocated, typically through governance tokens. Panelists emphasized that while DAOs are often romanticized as “leaderless” or “fully decentralized,” most begin with a highly centralized architecture.

Developers and founders typically control the smart contract code and token distribution at inception, raising important legal questions about fiduciary responsibility and securities classification. The assumption that DAOs are inherently decentralized, the panel suggested, remains largely aspirational in practice.

One of the core legal challenges discussed was whether DAO-issued governance tokens represent securities under US law. Where tokens confer profit-sharing rights, voting influence, or equity-like characteristics, the SEC has increasingly argued they should fall within its jurisdiction, particularly when projects raise funds from the public with an expectation of profit.

Panelists referenced proposals, including a safe harbor framework, that would allow DAOs a limited period to decentralize before triggering securities law compliance. While such proposals have yet to be formally adopted, they reflect a broader recognition within parts of the SEC and academic community that DAOs do not fit cleanly into existing legal categories.

In parallel, states like Wyoming have moved to recognize DAOs as legal entities, attempting to bring structure and liability protection to what has traditionally been an amorphous form of organization. However, this approach is not yet harmonized at the federal level.

Beyond securities regulation, the panel highlighted the operational dilemmas DAOs face when interfacing with real-world assets, particularly intellectual property.

One use case presented involved DAOs funding scientific research and owning the resulting IP, with the token price reflecting the perceived value of the underlying innovation. In such cases, DAOs act as venture funds and IP holding vehicles, requiring governance protocols for licensing, attribution, and revenue distribution.

Yet, many DAO participants lack clarity on their legal rights or responsibilities as token holders, especially when outcomes depend on jurisdictional nuances or enforceability of smart contracts. Panelists called for clearer frameworks on tokenholder liability, tax treatment, and cross-border enforceability, noting that without these, DAOs risk remaining legally vulnerable despite their technological sophistication.

The path forward, they suggested, may lie in hybrid models that pair the code-based efficiency of DAOs with formal legal wrappers and accountability mechanisms drawn from corporate and nonprofit law.