Ten years on from the UK SMCR: What can the Swiss learn?
What FINMA is proposing and five lessons the Swiss can learn from the UK's Senior Managers Regime.
The UK switched on the Senior Managers Regime (SMCR) for banks in March 2016. Ten years on, Switzerland is consulting on a version of its own, and the UK is busy taking parts of the original apart.
I spent over 20 years at UBS, so I read the Swiss proposal with more than academic interest. The consultation closes on November 19. The Federal Council has clearly studied the UK model and learned some of its lessons, though not all of them.
What Switzerland is proposing
Banks with 250 or more full-time staff would have to document who is responsible for what. That means a firm-wide responsibilities overview, plus individual statements signed by each person in scope. FINMA could bring smaller banks in case by case. Think MRM (Model Risk Management) and SORs (Stabilization Options / Recovery Frameworks).
More people would need FINMA’s approval before taking up their roles. Beyond the board and executive board, the regime would cover the heads of risk, compliance, internal audit, operations, finance, and IT, and the head of any business unit generating 10% or more of revenue. At a G-SIB, which in Switzerland sadly now means only UBS, the explanatory report generally expects the whole layer below the executive board to be caught. That’s potentially a lot of people, far more than are senior managers in the UK.
A new statutory duty of care would apply to everyone who has to meet FINMA’s fit-and-proper test, at every bank. It requires them to act with due care and to ensure compliance with the law and internal rules within their area. Banks would sanction breaches first, through pay and discipline, with FINMA stepping in for serious cases.
FINMA would gain a power to fine banks, but not individuals, and would normally have to publish the outcome of completed enforcement proceedings. It has always seemed anachronistic to me that FINMA couldn’t fine. There were several large enforcement matters in my time when the UK/US etc took large fines from UBS but the Swiss got nothing.
The Federal Council plans to send a bill to Parliament in 2027. Banks would then have a year from entry into force to comply.
Five lessons from the UK
1. The paperwork has done more than the enforcement actions
When the SMCR arrived, everyone expected senior managers to be pursued for failures on their watch. There have been dozens of investigations open but most have ended without formal action.
Ten years in, the industry is still waiting for an instructive Duty of Responsibility case. The regulators themselves accept that the regime has worked better as a deterrent than as a source of penalties. The decade’s most prominent senior manager case, against Jes Staley, was about how he described his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein to the FCA. Reasonable steps did not come into it.
That may change: six of the 23 enforcement cases the FCA opened between June and December 2025 concern individuals only. But the lesson for Switzerland stands. The value of a regime like this lies in the clarity it forces before anything goes wrong, which is why FINMA’s lack of a power to fine individuals matters less than it might seem.
2. If FINMA approves more people, it needs a timetable
Approval times have been a long-running complaint in the UK. The regulators now work to a three-month statutory deadline, which the government proposes to cut to two, and they publish quarterly figures on how they perform. The FCA reports deciding 99.7% of applications within three months (although the clock stops fairly frequently so that figure needs salt).
The UK government now wants the regulators to reduce the number of roles needing pre-approval. Switzerland is widening it. That is defensible for the roles that matter, but FINMA will need the capacity to match. Banks should press for a decision deadline and publish turnaround figures of the kind the UK regulators now produce.
3. Keep the documents short, and keep them current
In the UK, statements of responsibilities have a habit of turning into quasi-legal documents, written to protect the signer as much as to tell them what they own. A recent interview study found senior managers documenting decisions to shield themselves from personal liability. Firms also complained about updating statements for every minor or temporary change, and since April they have had six months to notify changes.
The Swiss have left the content of their statements to the Banking Ordinance, which has not yet been published. That is an opportunity. A statement a manager can read in five minutes, and recognize as their job, will do more than a long one drafted with a future tribunal in mind. The UK government’s stated aim is now to halve the regime’s administrative burden, so it is better to start lean than to slim down later.
4. Watch what the duty of care reaches
The UK’s Duty of Responsibility bites only once the firm has breached a regulatory requirement. The Swiss duty of care goes further, covering compliance with internal rules as well as the law.
That sounds like a good idea. However, unless the final text narrows, a breach of internal policy could become a potential breach of statute. The predictable response is fewer and vaguer internal policies, the exact opposite of what the Federal Council wants. A materiality threshold would help.
To its credit, the draft puts the burden on the bank or FINMA to prove a breach. There is no automatic liability for whatever goes wrong in your area. The UK reached the same place when it replaced the presumption of responsibility with the Duty of Responsibility.
5. Draw the line by risk
The 250 threshold comes from SECO’s definition of a small or medium-sized enterprise. Headcount measures size, and a 150-person private bank with a high-risk client book can carry way more conduct risk than a much larger retail lender. Anyone know what the headcount was of Falcon Private Bank before it was shut down? FINMA’s power to designate additional banks is the safety valve, and it should be used.
The documentation is coming anyway
The academic case for a dedicated regime rests on behavioral research showing that responsibility diffuses inside large organizations unless someone pins it down. Dr Gentiana Imeri makes that case in a recent EuZ article (in German). I agree with the mechanism, though she accepts that hard evidence on how well these regimes work remains limited.
Whatever Bern decides, the documentation half is becoming standard. Under CRD VI, EU banks must keep individual statements of roles and duties and a mapping of duties, so Swiss groups with EU banking subsidiaries will need them there regardless, even if they’ve avoided their SMCR equivalents. The real choices in the Swiss draft are how far pre-approval should reach and what the duty of care should cover. Those are the points worth pressing before November 19.
Andrew Williams is the director of Simpson Street. He is an experienced Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel and a former Chief Compliance Officer at UBS AG, one of the world’s largest and most complex financial institutions. He has held senior roles in London, Singapore, Sydney, and Zurich.
Alongside coaching, Andrew consults for the international law firm Simmons and Simmons, lectures at Cambridge and Zurich Universities, and chairs the Disciplinary Tribunal of the London Metal Exchange. Click on Conduct Unbecoming to subscribe to Andrew’s newsletter.

